ABSTRACT: The Likelihood Principle has been defended on Bayesian grounds, on the grounds that it coincides with and systematizes intuitive judgments about example problems, and by appeal to the fact that it generalizes what is true when hypotheses have deductive consequences about observations. Here we divide the Principle into two parts --one qualitative, the other quantitative --and evaluate each in the light of the Akaike information criterion. Both turn out to be correct in a special case (when the competing hypotheses have the same number of adjustable parameters), but not otherwise.
Mark Anthony said that he came to bury Caesar, not to praise him. In contrast, our goal in connection with the likelihood concept is neither to bury likelihood nor to praise it. Instead of praising the concept, we will present what we think is an important criticism. However, the upshot of this criticism is not the conclusion that likelihood should be buried, but paradoxically, a justification of likelihood, properly understood.
Before we get to our criticism of likelihood, we should say that we agree with the criticisms that likelihoodists have made of Neyman-Pearson-Fisher statistics and of Bayesianism (Edwards 1987 , Royall 1997 . In our opinion, likelihood looks very good indeed when it is compared with these alternatives. However, the question remains of what can be said in defense of likelihood that is positive. Royall begins his excellent book with three lines of justification.
He points out, first, that the likelihood principle makes intuitive sense when probabilities are all 1's and 0's. If the hypothesis H 1 says that what we observe must occur, and the hypothesis H 2 says that it cannot, then surely it is clear that the observations strongly favor H 1 over H 2 . The likelihood principle seems to be an entirely natural generalization from this special case; if O strongly favors H 1 over H 2 when Pr(O | H 1 ) = 1 and Pr(O | H 2 ) = 0, then surely it is reasonable to say that O favors H 1 over H 2 if Pr(O | H 1 ) > Pr(O | H 2 ).
Royall's second argument is that the likelihood ratio is precisely the factor that transforms a ratio of prior probabilities into a ratio of posteriors. This is because Bayes's theorem (and the definition of conditional probability from which it derives) entails that It therefore makes sense to view the likelihood ratio as a valid measure of the evidential meaning that the observations possess.
Royall's third line of defense of the likelihood principle is to show that it coincides with intuitive judgments about evidence when the principle is applied to specific cases. Here Royall is claiming for likelihood what philosophers typically claim in defense of the explications they recommend. For example, Rawls (1971) said of his theory of justice that his account is to be assessed by seeing whether the principles he describes have implications that coincide with our intuitive judgments about what is just and what is not in specific situations.
While we think there is value in each of these three lines of defense, none is as strong as one might wish. Even if the likelihood principle has plausible consequences in the limit case when all probabilities are 1's and 0's, the possibility exists that other measures of evidential meaning might do the same. Though these alternatives agree with likelihood in the limit case, they may disagree elsewhere. If so, the question remains as to why likelihood should be preferred over these other measures. In any event, friends of likelihood might want a stronger justification than the three-point defense that Royall provides. Whether there is anything more that can be said remains to be seen. In this regard, Edwards (1987, p. 100 ) endorsed Fisher's (1938) claim that likelihood should be regarded as a "primitive postulate;" it coincides with and systematizes our intuitions about examples, but nothing more can be said in its behalf. This, we should note, is often the fate of philosophical explications. If likelihood is epistemologically fundamental, then we should not be surprised to find that it cannot be justified in terms of anything that is more fundamental. It would not be an objection to the likelihood concept if it turned out to be an item of rock-bottom epistemology.
Royall follows Hacking (1965) in construing the likelihood principle as a two-part doctrine.
There is first of all the idea, noted above, which we will call the qualitative Likelihood Principle:
Notice that this principle could be expressed, equivalently, by saying that the likelihood ratio must be greater than unity or that the difference in likelihoods must be greater than 0.
Hacking adds to this a second and logically stronger claim-that the likelihood ratio measures the degree to which the observations favor one hypothesis over the other: Royall does not take up the task of defending (DEGREE). Our discussion in what follows will focus mainly on the principle (QUAL), but we will have some comments on the principle (DEGREE) as well.
There is a third element in Royall's discussion that we should mention, one that differs from both (QUAL) and (DEGREE 
As was true of (DEGREE), principle (R) includes (QUAL) as a special case, but not conversely. Furthermore, (R) and (DEGREE) are logically independent. Royall recognizes that the choice of cut-off specified in (R) is conventional. In what follows, our discussion of (QUAL) will allow us to make some critical comments on (R) as well.
One of Royall's simple but extremely important points is that it is essential to distinguish carefully among three questions that you might want to address when evaluating the testimony of the observations:
(1) What should you do? (2) What should you believe? (3) What do the observations tell you about the hypotheses you're considering?
Royall argues that Neyman-Pearson statistics addresses question (1). However, if this is the question that the Neyman-Pearson approach tries to answer, then the question falls in the domain of decision theory, in which case utilities as well as probabilities need to be considered. Question (2) is the one that Bayesians address. Question (3) is different from (2) and also from (1); (3) is the proper province for the likelihood concept. Royall considers the possibility that Fisher's idea of statistical significance might be used in Neyman-Pearson statistics to address question (3). However, a good part of Royall's book is devoted to showing that the likelihoodist's answer to question (3) is better.
We will argue in what follows that (3) needs to be subdivided. There are at least two different questions you might ask about the bearing of evidence on hypotheses:
(3a) What do the observations tell you about the truth of the hypotheses you're considering? (3b) What do the observations tell you about the predictive accuracy of the hypotheses you're considering?
Question (3a) is what we think Royall has in mind in his question (3). The second concept, of predictive accuracy, is something we'll discuss later. It is an important feature of this concept that a false model is sometimes more predictively accurate than a true one. The search for truth and the search for predictive accuracy are different; this is why we separate questions (3a) and (3b).
To develop these ideas, we now turn to a type of inference problem that is, we think, the Achilles heel of the likelihood approach. This is the problem of "model selection." By a "model," we mean a statement that contains at least one adjustable parameter. Models are composite hypotheses. Consider, for example, the problem of deciding whether the dependent variable y and the independent variable x are related linearly or parabolically:
In these models, a, b, and c are adjustable parameters, while u is an error term with a normal distribution with zero mean and a fixed variance. Fixing the parameter values picks out a specific straight line or a specific parabola.
How can likelihood be used to choose between these models? That is, how are we to compare Pr(Data | LIN) and Pr(Data | PAR)? As Royall says, there are no general and entirely valid solutions of the problem of assessing the likelihoods of composite hypotheses. Let us consider some alternative proposals and see how they fare. The model LIN is a family, composed of the infinite set of straight lines in the x-y plane. Strictly speaking, the likelihood of LIN is an average of the likelihoods of all these straight lines:
If we have no way to figure out how probable different straight lines are, conditional on LIN, then we cannot evaluate the likelihood. Suppose, however, that every straight line has the same probability as every other, conditional on LIN. In this case Pr(Data | LIN) = 0 and the same is true of Pr(Data | PAR) (Forster and Sober 1994) . This is an unsatisfactory conclusion, since scientists often believe that the data discriminate between LIN and PAR.
This example, we should mention, also illustrates a problem for Bayesianism, one that Popper (1959) This illustrates a general point-when models are nested, it is almost certain that more complex models will fit the data better than models that are simpler. However, scientists don't take this as a reason to conclude that the data always favor PAR over LIN. Instead, they often observe that simplicity, and not just likelihood, matters in model selection. If L(LIN) and L(PAR) fit the data about equally well, it is widely agreed that one should prefer L(LIN). And if LIN is compared with a polynomial that has 100 terms, scientists will say that even if L(POLY-100) fits the data much better than L(LIN) does, that still one might want to interpret the data as favoring L(LIN). Likelihood is an incomplete device for interpreting what the data say. It needs to be supplemented by due attention to simplicity. But how can simplicity be represented in a likelihood framework?
sense that the probability density cannot integrate to 1. If the density is zero, then it integrates to zero. If it is nonzero, then it integrates to infinity, no matter how small. That is, the density is improper because it cannot be normalized. For the purpose of calculating the posterior probability, this does not matter because if the density is everywhere equal to some arbitrary non-zero constant, then the posterior density of any curve is proportional to its likelihood, and the arbitrary constant drops out when one normalizes the posterior (which one should do whenever possible). So, Bayesians got used to the idea that improper priors are acceptable. However, they are not acceptable for the purpose of calculating average likelihoods because there is no such thing as the normalization of likelihoods (they are not probabilities). Of course, one could instead assume that the arbitrary constant is the same for all models. Then each average likelihood is proportional to the sum (integral) of all the likelihoods. But to compare integrals of different dimensions is like comparing the length of a line with the area of a rectangle-it makes little sense when there is no principled way of specifying the units of measurement (Forster and Sober 1994) . For example, if one compares the very simple model y = a with y = a + bx, and then with y = a + 2bx, the added bdimension is scaled differently. So, when one integrates the likelihood function over parameter space, the result is different (unless one can justify the formula y = a + bx uniquely as the principled choice). An uneasiness about Schwarz's derivation has since led some Bayesians to invent other ways to compute average likelihoods (see Wasserman, 2000 , for an easy technical introduction to the Bayesian literature). One proposal, which also gets around our objection, is the theory of "intrinsic Bayes factors" due to Berger and Pericchi (1996) . The idea is to "pre-conditionalize" on each datum in the data set and average the results to obtain a well-conditioned and "approximately" uniform "prior." Then the average likelihoods are non-zero and can be compared straightforwardly. First, we note that this is not a vindication of Schwarz's argument because it yields a different criterion. Second, this solution appears to us to be unacceptably ad hoc as well.
We think that it cannot, at least not when simplicity is a consideration in model selection.
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This is our criticism of likelihood. However, there is another inferential framework in which the role of simplicity in model selection makes perfect sense. This framework was proposed by the statistician H. Akaike (one of his earliest articles is Akaike, 1973 ; one of his latest is Akaike, 1985; see Sakamoto et al. 1986 for a thorough introduction to his method, and Burnham and Anderson 1998 for some scientific applications of Akaike's approach). The Akaike framework assumes that inference has a specific goal; the goal is not to decide which hypothesis is most probably true, or most likely, but to decide which will be most predictively accurate.
What does it mean to talk about the predictive accuracy of a model, like LIN? Imagine that we sample a set of data points from the true underlying distribution and use that data to find the best fitting straight line, namely L(LIN). We then use L(LIN) to predict the location of a new set of data. We draw these new data and see how close L(LIN) comes to predicting their values. Imagine repeating this process many times, using an old data set to find L(LIN) and then using that fitted model to predict new data. The average closeness to new data (as measured by the perdatum log-likelihood) is LIN's predictive accuracy. If the true underlying distribution is in fact linear, LIN may do poorly on some of these trials, but, on average, it will do well. On the other hand, if the true underlying distribution is highly nonlinear, LIN may do fairly well occasionally, but, on average, it will do a poor job of predicting new data. Obviously, the predictive accuracy of a model depends on what the true underlying distribution is. However, in making an inference, we of course don't know in advance what the truth is. Maximizing predictive accuracy might be a sensible goal, but, so far, it appears to be epistemologically inaccessible. Is it possible to figure out, given the single data set before us, how predictively accurate a model is apt to be?
Akaike proved a surprising theorem, 6 one that shows that predictive accuracy is epistemologically accessible. He showed that an unbiased estimate of a model's predictive accuracy can be obtained by taking the log-likelihood of its likeliest case, relative to the data at hand, and correcting that best-case likelihood with a penalty for complexity:
An unbiased estimate of the predictive accuracy of model
Here k is the number of adjustable parameters in the model (see Forster 1999 for a more exact description of the meaning of k). LIN contains two adjustable parameters, whereas PAR contains 3, and POLY-100 contains 101. 7 Akaike's theorem says that likelihood provides information about the predictive accuracy of a model, but the information is always distorted. Likelihood is like a bathroom scale that always tells you that you are lighter than you are. Its outputs are evidentially relevant, but they need to be corrected.
We now can explain our earlier remark that a true model can be less predictively accurate than a false one. Suppose you know that the relationship of x and y is nonlinear and parabolic. It still can make sense to use LIN to predict new data from old, if L(LIN) fits the data about as well as L(PAR). The truth can be a misleading predictor. It is a familiar fact that idealizations are valuable in science when a fully realistic model is either unavailable or is mathematically intractable. The Akaike framework reveals an additional virtue that idealizations can haveeven when we possess a fully realistic (true) model, a (false) idealization can be a better predictor (Forster and Sober 1994 , Sober 1999 , Forster 2000a ).
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As we mentioned earlier, model selection is the Achilles heel of likelihood. Yet Akaike's theorem describes a general circumstance in which likelihood provides an unbiased estimate of a model's predictive accuracy-when two models have the same number of parameters, the likelihoods of their likeliest cases provide an unbiased indication of which can be expected to be more predictively accurate. Likelihood needn't be viewed as a primitive postulate. We needn't resign ourselves to the idea that we value likelihood for its own sake. If predictive accuracy is your goal, likelihood is one relevant consideration because it helps you estimate a model's predictive accuracy. And when the models under consideration are equally complex, likelihood is the only thing you need to consider. Likelihood is a means to an end and is justified relative to that end.
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Not only does the qualitative likelihood principle receive a circumscribed justification from the Akaike framework; in addition, we can use Akaike's theorem to evaluate the (DEGREE) principle and principle (R) as well. The theorem provides an unbiased criterion for when one model will be more predictively accurate than another:
M 1 is estimated to be more predictively accurate than M 2 if and only if
This can be rewritten as M 1 is estimated to be more predictively accurate than M 2 if and only if
If k 1 = k 2 , this can be stated, equivalently, by saying that the likelihood ratio must be greater than 1 or by saying that the difference in likelihoods must be greater than 0.
10 However, if k 1 ≠ k 2 , a ratio criterion can be formulated, but there is no equivalent criterion that can be stated purely in terms of likelihood differences.
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This helps distinguish some measures of strength of evidence from others, as (DEGREE) requires.
Similar remarks apply to Royall's principle (R). If k 1 = k 2 , Royall's stipulation in (R) of the number 8 as the cut-off separating strong from weak evidence favoring H 1 over H 2 is a possibility (though other cut-offs are possible as well). However, when exp(k 1 −k 2 ) > 8, the difference between strong and weak evidence cannot be defined by the proposed cut-off of 8. Akaike's theorem does not determine how the distinction between weak and strong evidence should be drawn, but it does restrict the search to criteria defined in terms of likelihood ratios.
Our defense of (DEGREE) is not a defense of everything it implies. Remember that (DEGREE) equates the degree to which O favors H 1 over H 2 with the likelihood ratio, and this implies two things: (a) that the likelihood ratio is the correct way of capturing how the degree of fit between O and H 1 and between O and H 2 influences the degree to which O favors H 1 over H 2 , and (b) nothing else influences the degree to which O favors H 1 over H 2 . Part (a) rules out the possibility that any other measures of fit, such as the sum of the absolute values of the residuals between the data and the mean curve of the hypothesis, affect the relative degree of support. For AIC, H 1 and H 2 are the likeliest hypotheses L(M 1 ) and L(M 2 ), and the degree to which O favors L(M 1 ) over L(M2) depends on the likelihood ratio and exp(k 1 −k 2 ). The latter term corrects for an expected overfitting bias, which would otherwise provide the more complex model with an unfair advantage.
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AIC therefore agrees with part (a) of (DEGREE), but denies part (b). This leads us to following general principle:
(DEGREE Prime) The likelihood ratio is the correct way of capturing how the degree of fit between O and H 1 and between O and H 2 influences the degree to which O favors H 1 over H 2 .
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In the special case of comparing simple hypotheses, H 1 and H 2 , for which there are no selection biases, (DEGREE Prime) reduces to (DEGREE).
The argument for this principle arises out of the form of AIC-the fact that AIC can be expressed as: O favors L(M 1 ) over L(M 2 ) if and only if Pr(O | L(M 1 ))/ Pr(O | L(M 2 )) > K. However, we have to admit that our argument is only as strong as its premises, and not every statistician will agree that AIC stands on firm foundations. 14 In fact, the argument really depends on the premise that model selection should have this form for some K. The exact value of K does not matter. As it turns out, almost all model selection criteria in the literature can be expressed in this basic form, including BIC (Schwarz 1978) , variations on AIC (e. g., Hurvich and Tsai 1989) , posterior Bayes factors (Aitkin 1991) , and an important class of Neyman-Pearson hypothesis tests. 15 Moreover, all of these criteria apply to a wide variety of statistical applications, including contingency table analysis, regression models, analysis of variance, and time series. There are many independent arguments for (DEGREE Prime).
But is that the end of the debate? One still might dream of a unified perspective from which everything else follows, including a corrected version of Royall's distinction between weak and strong evidence. Akaike's framework goes one step beyond Fisher's view that likelihood is fundamental, but one still might wish for more.
